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“Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (REDD) is 
emerging as a major new climate change mechanism that could deeply impact the 
financial, social and institutional dynamics of deforestation, conservation, and 
development in many developing countries. It has the potential to influence global 
forest governance in a socially acceptable way. The mechanism as it stands needs 
much improvement to avoid the pitfalls of earlier forest governance mechanisms. 
The research, at this stage, is not sufficient to improve it. Most of the literature is 
fairly slanted towards technical issues and the prospective design of the scheme or 
normative opposition to it. Despite this copious amounts of scholarly and advocacy 
work, there is too little attention focused on the social and governance dimensions 
of the proposals. 
 
Author’s Note 
Forests are crucial in the struggle for sustainable development. Not only do 
they have a role in the preservation of global ecological systems, but moreover they 
are especially important for supporting the livelihoods of local populations. When 
forests were first addressed in the context of climate change, they were assessed in 
mostly financial and technical terms. We think there is a need to insert a social 
perspective into the debate, taking into account the lessons learned from many 
years of intervening in developing countries‟ forests. Engineers who have designed 
REDD as a brilliant, but top-down, scheme for tropical forests conservation seem 
to have forgotten such lessons. Without addressing deforestation, climate 
objectives cannot be reached. But further, drawing from years of work on forests, 
we see that without considering the impacts on local societies and the lessons 
learned from development aid REDD cannot succeed. This paper is part of the 
effort to ensure REDD will prevail in social terms. 
 
Keywords: Reduced emissions, deforestation, forest degradation, 
tropical forests, environmental governance, social impacts. 
 
1. Introduction 
Forests cover 29% of the terrestrial surface (Schmitt et al., 2008) and provide 
vital ecosystems services (MEA, 2005a). They also store 50% of terrestrial organic 
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carbon and contain much of the Earth‟s biodiversity. Tropical forests contain 50% 
of terrestrial biological diversity over 6% of the world‟s surface (Wilson, 1992). But 
globally, sustainable forest management remains insufficiently competitive compared 
with more destructive uses of forests (van Dijk & Savenije, 2009); 13 million hectares 
are lost annually to deforestation (approximately the size of the United Kingdom) 
(FAO, 2010), 97% of which takes place in tropical countries (Nabuurs et al., 2007). 
Deforestation is responsible for 18% of global CO2 emissions (Stern, 2006), adding 
as much carbon to the atmosphere as the transport sector. Moreover, deforestation 
inflicts high biodiversity losses (MEA, 2005b) and triggers the loss of key ecosystem 
services (Elmqvist et al., 2010). There is widespread agreement on the need to halt 
deforestation.  
Direct and underlying causes of deforestation are known (Geist & Lambin, 
2001). They are traditionally divided into proximate causes (infrastructure expansion, 
logging, conversion of land for agriculture and ranching, extractive industries, etc.) 
and underlying factors (economic aspects, such as the global demand for timber, 
soybeans or meat, as well as policy-related, institutional, technological, socio-cultural, 
demographic, et cetera). These causes are interlinked; for example, a road built for 
logging will attract settlers, who may clear-cut forests to ready land for agriculture. 
Many mechanisms aimed at curbing deforestation are already in place, some 
more successful than others. Protected areas already cover 13.5% of the world‟s 
forests (Schmitt et al., 2008). If well managed, they can constitute an effective tool 
against deforestation (Bruner, 2001; Hayes, 2006), especially when they involve 
multi-user or indigenous governance systems (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009; Nelson & 
Chomitz, 2009). Other governance mechanisms, such as those led by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), the 
World Bank, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), have proven useful under certain conditions, but are 
manifestly insufficient if the global deforestation rate is considered (Humphreys, 
2006). These programs lack an effective process of governance for forests at the 
global level, something weakly promoted by developed countries and fiercely 
opposed by developing countries under the principles of national sovereignty1 and 
differentiated responsibility. This has resulted in segmented, fragmented, 
underfunded, incoherent, or “non-binding” instruments.  
Two mechanisms have been particularly debated and tested in the context of 
the climate and biodiversity global governance processes. One prominent approach 
has been the forest-related carbon sink projects pursued under the Kyoto Protocol‟s 
Clean Development Mechanism. These projects harness the carbon market to 
compensate developed countries‟ excess carbon emissions with tree plantations in 
developing countries. The projects‟ contribution to mitigating climate change seems 
very modest, and they have been criticized for promoting large monoculture tree 
plantations (Kill et al., 2010), as well as involving problems of additionality, leakage 
                                                 
1 Depending on the ideological lens employed, claiming sovereignty can be justified as an effort to 
thwart a neo-colonial attempt to control forest resources in the vein of Dependency Theory (see 
Fearnside 2009), or as an endeavor to preserve internal inequalities by enhancing the domination of 
national elites over natural resources, a view indigenous peoples often advance (e.g. Goldtooth 2010). 
Either way, the impact has been the same – evoking sovereignty has barred global governance 
structures from conserving forests.   
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and permanence (Plantinga & Richards, 2008). The other prominent approach is 
payments for ecosystem services (PES), which are payments to communities, 
individuals, or governments for safeguarding and maintaining ecosystem services like 
clean water (Gómez-Beggethun et al., 2010; TEEB, 2010; Wallace, 2007; Wunder et 
al., 2008).2 They are considered beneficial for the involved partners (Tacconi et al., 
2009) but unlikely to replace other conservation instruments (Wunder, 2006). They 
must be carefully designed to avoid focusing excessively on one resource (e.g. water) 
or reproducing and even strengthening power asymmetries and social inequalities 
(Kosoy & Corbera, 2010).  
In the context of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, “avoided deforestation” was not originally 
included in its implementation agreement, the Kyoto Protocol. Controversial forest 
and other land issues were left out for a variety of reasons including the apparent 
complexity of managing deforestation and forest degradation (Morgan et al., 2005; 
Skutsch et al., 2007), fear of a possible flood of credits into the carbon markets 
(Silva-Chavez, 2005; Vera Diaz & Schwarzen, 2005) and possible negative 
biodiversity impacts (Greenpeace, 2003). At the 11th Conference of the Parties in 
2005 in Montreal, developing countries3 proposed a mechanism called “Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD).4 Portrayed as a 
“win-win” for developing and developed countries alike, the mechanism has gained 
momentum and support. It became a widely discussed subject in view of post-Kyoto 
arrangements (after-2012) and is one of the few consensual solutions agreed to by 
the UNFCCC negotiators in Copenhagen (COP-15, 2009) and Cancún (COP-16, 
2010). It has also generated an abundant literature, including academic papers,5 
reports and advocacy papers. This is noteworthy for a mechanism that remains 
experimental, only due to start after 2012. Is there a chance that REDD will be the 
first successful attempt to manage forests at global scale (Grainger & Oberteiner, 
2010)? 
 
2. REDD: Nuts and Bolts 
The basic idea of REDD is “to generate a significant level of compensation 
or economic incentive to outweigh the income generated through deforestation” 
                                                 
2 A classic example is the New York watershed management plan for the Catskills, which disburses 
funds in upstream communities in the Catskills to assure water quality to downstream users in New 
York City (see Isakson, 2002). 
3 It was proposed by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica in 2005. (UNFCCC, 2005). 
4 The initial discussion was about “avoided deforestation” (AD), which would have covered slowing 
deforestation rates in existing forests. In 2005, the discussion turned to “Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation in Developing Countries”, with only one “D” (RED). Gradually, the idea of including 
forest degradation was accepted and the acronym gained a second “D” (Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation). This was confirmed at Bali (UNFCCC COP 13) in 2007. The 
“Bali Action Plan” (Paragraph 1b.iii) also mentioned the role of conservation, sustainable 
management and carbon stock enhancement, an innovation that was dubbed REDD+. The debate on 
whether or not to include CDM‟s afforestation and reforestation (creating or re-creating a forest) in 
REDD is still ongoing.  
5 For 2010 alone, we have compiled over 60 papers in international peer-reviewed journals such as 
Science, Global Environmental Change, Ecological Economics, Environmental Science and Policy, Climatic Change, 
International Environmental Agreements, The Journal of Environment and Development, etc. We therefore do not 
pretend to cover the entire literature base, but a selected sample. 
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(FoEI, 2008, p. 9). Influential reports have presented avoided deforestation as a cost 
effective mitigation option for climate change and a potential development 
opportunity since it would provide additional financial resources for national 
governments and local communities to invest in health, education and sustainable 
development (Chomitz et al., 2007; Eliasch, 2008; Lubowski, 2008; Murray et al., 
2009; Stern, 2006).  
While the prospective costs of deforestation‟s contribution to climate change 
have been estimated between $1 and $2 trillion USD annually (Eliasch, 2008; 
Lubowski, 2008; Tavoni et al., 2007), the annual costs for halving emissions from 
forests could be in the range of US$7 to $33 billion, sums developing countries 
would receive for their efforts (Eliasch, 2008; Kindermann et al., 2008; Torres et al., 
2010). The message emanating from this body of work is that by preventing 
deforestation, global carbon emissions could be reduced significantly and at a lower 
cost, while simultaneously accomplishing important development objectives (Eliasch, 
2008; Nepstad et al., 2009; Stern, 2006; Sohngen & Sedjo, 2006).6 
The mechanism‟s design will be crucial and there are high expectations amid 
heated debates. In general, REDD can be seen as continuous with PES, with several 
specificities, such as scale and the focus on the carbon stocking function of trees, 
while PES may address different services and often focus on water. Indeed, while 
being more specific, proposals for REDD are based largely on experiences related to 
PES programs (perceived as highly promising) and the carbon offset market (not 
seen as very promising). However, the manner in which this basic idea will be 
applied under the REDD mechanism has been highly disputed and intensely 
negotiated. Many points of contention remain (Alvarado & Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 
2007; Angelsen, 2008; Densham et al., 2009; FoEI, 2008; Karsenty & Pirard, 2007), 
which can be summarized as follows. 
 
2.1 Funding 
 Several funding models have been proposed (Karsenty, 2008), including a 
specialized public fund (Brazil‟s proposal in 2006, also discussed by the Stern 
Review) (Grasl et al., 2003; Hoogeveen et al., 2008; Viana, 2009) and a private, 
carbon market-based approach (ICF International, 2009; Loisel, 2008). A third 
option is to include both public and private funds in a hybrid or “basket” approach 
(Thies & Czebiniak, 2008). Other concerns have involved prospects for long-term 
funding, phases of implementation, distribution and safeguards, and sensibility to 
carbon market variations (Brown et al., 2009; Minang & Murphy, 2010). Under the 
current negotiations, it appears that the framework would use a hybrid approach, 
with capacity-building funds available for start-up and financial links with the carbon 




Different scales for implementation have been suggested as well. Under 
currently agreed terms, countries would report to an international funding 
                                                 
6 To keep things in proportion, official development assistance from OECD countries is expected to 
reach US$126 billion in 2010 (OECD, 2010).  
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mechanism (UNFCCC, 2010), although the financial mechanism and the reporting 
system still have to be designed (COP-16, 2010). The mechanism would mainly 
follow a national or country-driven approach: states will be responsible for the 
implementation of REDD within their borders according to the principle of national 
sovereignty (Anderson & Richards, 2001; Plantinga & Richards, 2008; UNFCCC, 
2010). This national model demonstrates another difference between REDD and 
PES. The latter is mostly oriented toward local and regional projects or carbon sinks, 
financed by the market-based mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol. REDD would, in 
certain versions, allow compensations for the maintenance of protected forests. 
Concrete REDD projects would nevertheless be “sub-national” (Santilli et al., 2005), 
and projects would be established on a small scale at the outset rather than 
immediately implemented nationwide. This combination is called the “nested” 
approach (Angelsen et al., 2008; Pedroni et al., 2009).  
The scale of REDD raises issues such as leakage, additionality, permanence, 
scope, baseline, and monitoring, as well as effectiveness, capacity, and governance 
(Angelsen et al., 2008; Pedroni et al., 2009; Densham et al., 2009). The national 
approach poses problems for countries with weak governance capacities or 
institutions (Plantinga & Richards, 2008), while a purely sub-national approach 
would risk leakage and raise questions of additionality and permanence (see below). 
Further questions, such as the relationship between a REDD carbon market and 
existing carbon markets, the question of which specific entities should manage 
REDD funds and coordinate the many funds recently created (e.g. the Oslo-Paris 
REDD Partnership), and under what monitoring system this would occur, remain 
open. 
 
2.3 Leakage, Additionality, and Permanence 
Leakage is a situation in which deforestation avoided in one area results in 
deforestation in another, whether within or between countries (Plantinga & Richards, 
2008), which could severely undermine the effectiveness of REDD (Schwarze et al., 
2003). Additionality is the idea that reduction in deforestation should be greater than 
what would have occurred otherwise. A related concern is permanence, the 
maintenance of forests and their carbon sequestration capacities over time (Dutschke 
& Angelsen, 2008). Insurance policies, temporary crediting, shared liability, long-
term accounting, buffering and pooling of credits have been proposed to combat the 
possibilities of accidents like fires or pest invasion or incidences of deforestation 




The activities and forests eligible for financing are debated. The model 
presently accepted by UNFCCC parties is an enlarged version of REDD 
(“REDD+”) that includes activities such as conservation, reforestation, afforestation 
and other forest enhancement activities rather than simply deforestation and forest 
degradation. As FAO currently defines plantations as forests, a country could 
theoretically increase its forest area through plantations while deforesting its standing 
old-growth forests. This would distort some of REDD‟s environmental co-benefits, 
including those linked to biodiversity conservation and sustainable development (van 
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Noordwijk & Minang, 2009). As an answer to this concern, Paragraph 2(e) of the 
Annex I (Guidance and safeguards) of the Decision adopted in COP 16 states that 
REDD actions should be consistent with the conservation of natural forests and not 
used for their conversion (UNFCCC, 2010).  
 
2.5 Baseline 
Another concern in designing REDD has been determining the “baseline” or 
“a level of emissions that would occur in the absence of a forest carbon policy and is 
used as a reference case for quantifying mitigation performance” (Olander et al., 
2009, p. 32). Since baselines serve to assess the effectiveness of programs and 
allocation of emissions reduction credits, they have been a source of contention 
(Olander et al., 2007). The use of historical deforestation to project deforestation 
rates (Sathaye & Andrasko, 2007; Schlamadinger et al., 2005), or the use of 
“business-as-usual” projections (Soares-Filo et al., 2006) have been critiqued as 
perverse incentives encouraging adverse selection since those nations historically 
responsible for deforestation emissions are selected and rewarded rather than those 
who have historically left their forests intact (Plantinga & Richards, 2008).  
 
2.6 Monitoring 
A consensus has emerged that emissions reductions should be measurable, 
reportable, and verifiable (Verchot & Petkova, 2009), but verifying how much 
carbon is in fact sequestered and the effective reduction of deforestation is difficult. 
Lack of transparency (Anderson et al., 2009), over- or under-estimations (Balzter & 
Shvidenko, 2000), and the cost and accuracy of current technologies (Anderson et 
al., 2009; Murray et al., 2009) are limiting factors. Monitoring deforestation and 
degradation and evaluating the carbon sequestered have greatly improved with 
remote sensing (DeFries et al., 2006; Gibbs et al., 2007). Still, many questions remain, 
such as who should certify REDD schemes, on what basis, with which techniques, 
and whether the capacity of developing countries to undertake the program‟s 
technical requirements and enforce restrictions is sufficient, even with capacity-
building activities (Westholm et al., 2009).  
Most of the expansive, fast-growing body of literature has been dedicated to 
these questions, but it remains mainly prospective as relatively few field cases are 
available for early empirical assessment. In 2007 the UNFCCC called upon parties 
and international organizations to promote REDD through capacity-building and 
demonstration activities. Consequently, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO created a program 
(UN-REDD) to help countries prepare themselves for implementing REDD. To this 
end, the World Bank also administers the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). 
This support has prompted the involvement of many new actors of different natures 
(NGOs, private firms, research networks) in REDD activities and the rapid 
emergence of REDD experiments at the sub-national level. Wertz-Kanounnikoff 
and Metta Kongphan-Apirak studied over one hundred pioneer REDD projects 
underway and differentiated between REDD-readiness activities (65 cases of legal 
and institutional preparation of national strategies) and “demonstration activities” 
(44 projects implemented on a field level) (2009). Of the latter, half are located in 
Indonesia, the country with the highest amount of greenhouse gas emissions sourced 
from deforestation, and they all are local and pioneer experiments. One year later, 
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Cerbu et al. surveyed 79 preparedness activities (national level) and a hundred 
demonstration activities (sub-national level), in 40 countries, most of which took 
place in Brazil (17) and Indonesia (22) (2010). The survey concluded that a bias exists 
for activities in Latin America to the detriment of Africa. 
Factors such as prior experience, the quality of partnerships, the perceived 
threat to forests and biodiversity, and the quality of governance determine where 
projects are established. Clearly, the number of REDD projects are growing rapidly, 
a rush that could be harmful for the eventual social and even environmental impacts. 
Additionally, the concentration of projects in specific regions could be detrimental to 
future design. If success is highly dependent on specific conditions, reproducibility 
upon scale-up and across different nations might not be feasible. 
 
3. Governance and Social Aspects 
The review of literature and research on REDD reveals a clear gap on two 
issues: governance and social impacts. While governance and social aspects have 
been addressed in several studies and papers regarding REDD, systematic, and 
evidence-based arguments are still lacking. 
Governance includes the design of the mechanism at all levels, norms-setting 
procedures, related legal and informal institutional arrangements, and interactions 
between involved state and non-state actors. Additionally, governance encompasses 
horizontal (within a given level of government) and vertical (across levels of 
government) links with other issue areas (e.g. biodiversity, finance, trade, etc.), 
existing policies and institutions at the international, national, or local levels (Forsyth, 
2009; Minang & Murphy, 2010; UNFCCC, 2006). In general, governance of forests 
is notoriously bad (Hoogeven et al., 2008). During the last 10 years, efforts to slow 
deforestation rates globally have had little success (Pfaff et al., 2004). Estimates 
contend that deforestation rates will continue in all geographic areas (Sathaye et al., 
2007). 
Much of the literature covering the governance of REDD relates to 
comparing the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of the different proposed 
mechanisms like scale (Clarke, 2010; Kaimowitz, 2008; Viana, 2009), funding designs 
(Dooley et al., 2008; Viana, 2009; Hoogeveen et al., 2008; Clarke, 2010), monitoring 
systems (Lutrell et al., 2007; Peskett & Harkin, 2007), national forest policies, 
(Funder, 2009), state and non-state actors, and barriers and opportunities on the 
local scale (Scriven, 2009). While it appears that much of the „what‟ related to 
governance may have been resolved, the majority of the „how‟ is yet to be thoroughly 
investigated.  
Government competence at the national level will be a key factor in the 
success of REDD (Peskett et al., 2008). A significant concern is the problem of 
sending large sums of money to governments with poor track records, low 
institutional and governance capacities and weak commitments to transparency, 
accountability, and participation (Peskett et al., 2008; Ebeling & Yasue, 2008; 
Westholm et al., 2009). Some see REDD as an opportunity to strengthen forest 
governance, institutions and capacities (TNC, 2009; Olander et al., 2009). Others 
have questioned the capacity of REDD to produce such co-benefits (Bullock et al., 
2009; Hall, 2008; Livengood & Dixon, 2009; REDD Monitor, 2009).  
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Investing in governance institutions, engaging the local communities and 
addressing their needs has proven crucial to reducing deforestation in protected areas 
(Madeira, 2008). PES programs can be seen as indicating some of the effects of 
REDD, and the evidence thus far suggests that these programs have a bias against 
the poorest of the poor, although it is not clear whether this is due to correlation 
with other targeting criteria of the programs or to barriers to participation linked to 
poverty (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2007). Conflict over local and 
community land tenure, restricted access to forest resources, and unfair distribution 
of carbon revenues have been identified as possible consequences of poorly designed 
forest carbon programs (Olander et al., 2009). The effectiveness of PES schemes, 
conversely, have been shown to depend on an array of factors that enhance the role 
of the poor, such as community involvement, institutional and economic drivers, and 
resources for surveillance and policing (Mertens et al., 2004). Ensuring co-benefits 
could thus result in more efficient and effective programs (Durbin, 2007; Olander et 
al., 2009). A comprehensive, integrative approach with strong stakeholder 
participation may be more likely to address downfalls in REDD programs, as well as 
ensure success by preventing carbon emissions. In effect, legitimacy is a condition 
for effectiveness.  
In addition to governance, another central challenge for realizing REDD 
objectives is to ensure that social needs are met and sustained alongside the 
conservation of forests. The reduction of the biodiversity of forest areas, for 
instance, is a critical concern for REDD. Biodiversity is already under threat, as the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment recorded in 2005. The assessment concluded 
that poor countries have made little progress in reaching the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) objectives of conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. Loss of biodiversity deprives people of ecosystem services worth 
US$250 billion annually worldwide (MEA, 2005) and ecosystem services and other 
non-marketed goods are estimated to account for 47% to 89% percent of the GDP 
of the poor (TEEB, 2009). Poor people are most critically dependent on well-
functioning natural environments for their survival (Angelsen & Wunder, 2003). 
The need to seek synergetic solutions for diverse social-environmental 
challenges is recognized in the report “The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity” (TEEB, 2008, p. 16). The TEEB study concludes that investing in the 
restoration and maintenance of the Earth‟s ecosystems (valued at several trillion 
dollars) from forests and mangroves to wetlands and river basins can have a key role 
in countering climate change while providing ecosystem services necessary for the 
sustenance and vibrancy of human life. The TEEB findings recognize that enhancing 
the resilience of ecosystems and maintaining the planet‟s biodiversity are key 
elements in mitigation and adaptation agendas, and are culturally and socially 
valuable to diverse groups of peoples (TEEB, 2010). If REDD were designed to 
contribute to the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services by protecting 
vast areas of standing forest, it could contribute to guaranteeing long-held cultural 
practices and social benefits.   
Aligning social and environmental goals to promote human well-being has 
always been and still is the weak link in implementing sustainable development and 
biodiversity conservation (GBO, 2010), and REDD is no exception. The appeal of 
REDD for many of its advocates has been the prospect of significant “co-benefits” 
for indigenous people and other forest dwellers in terms of development and 
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livelihoods (Brown et al., 2008), but fears about local rights, unfairness, impacts on 
development, land use, livelihoods and food production have driven critiques of 
REDD (Griffiths, 2007). Whether conservation and social goals can be achieved 
simultaneously is debated (Newmark & Hough, 2000; Adams et al., 2004; Barrett et 
al., 2005). Many authors have recorded how local and indigenous people have 
suffered under previous conservation schemes, whether due to forced resettlement 
from protected areas (Adams & Hutton, 2007; Agrawal & Redford, 2009; Bray & 
Velazquez, 2009; Colchester, 1997; Dowie, 2009; Krueger, 2009; Schmidt-Soltau, 
2003), inadequate compensation for limitations on natural resource access (Peters, 
1998; Shyamsundar & Kramer, 1996), or the exacerbation of local conflicts (Agrawal 
& Gibson, 1999; Koch, 1997). Moreover, evidence from benefit-sharing schemes 
based on forest taxes or other revenues that were intended to be pro-poor have not 
been particularly successful (Bond et al., 2009); these revenues have often not 
reached the intended beneficiaries (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; Egbe, 2001; Frost & 
Bond, 2008), or have had only modest impacts on livelihoods (Bond & Mayers, 
2009; Porras et al., 2008). Given this history, many questions and concerns related to 
the impacts of REDD have emerged, but most recent literature is composed of 
preventive denunciations and policy recommendations. 
In responding to these concerns, research relies primarily on projections or 
hypotheses for the scheme, economic modeling, historical examples from PES or 
other conservation-development projects, or the few empirical examples existing to 
date, notably the Noel Kempf Project in Bolivia (Densham et al., 2009; Griffiths, 
2007; TNC, 2009). Because of these methods and the limited information available 
until now, much of the work related to these concerns simply raises many more 
questions than answers.  
 
4. Gaps in the Literature  
The narrow breadth of literature covering the design of REDD means we are 
still speculating about how REDD will be governed and what prospective effects it 
will produce in terms of development, livelihoods, human rights, and equity. These 
issues are critical, as an estimated 1.6 billion people, 60 million of whom are 
indigenous people, depend on forests for their survival (CBD, 2009; WB, 2004). But 
as the literature stands now, much more information is needed in order to design 
REDD properly in these terms; little attention has been given to the social 
dimension of any of the proposals being made to address climate change and forest 
protection. Among the main social issues requiring investigation are rights, 
development and equity.  
 
4.1 Rights, Local and Indigenous Peoples, and Land Tenure 
Widespread concerns relate to the impact of REDD on local and indigenous 
people‟s rights, most particularly their right to land (Butler, 2008; Castro Diaz, 2008; 
Griffiths, 2007; Peskett et al., 2008). Funder hypothesizes that the implementation of 
REDD could  be good or bad for local peoples, either solidifying recognition for 
their right to land or ignoring and abusing such rights (2009). According to its 
promoters, the Noel Kempff project in Bolivia demonstrated that REDD can 
reinforce and augment certain customary property rights (TNC, 2009). However, 
most of the literature questions this assertion. Weak land rights can potentially create 
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or exacerbate local conflicts and leave local people open to manipulation (Mayers et 
al., 2006). Cotula and Mayers lay out the complexity and variability of land tenure 
issues that REDD will affect, emphasizing the past failures of benefit-sharing 
schemes associated with forests (2009). Similarly, Bond et al. look at PES schemes 
worldwide and observe their potential for weakening land and resource rights (2009). 
The risk is that REDD schemes may result in governments, companies, conservation 
NGOs or speculators carving up forest lands, along with forest protection 
approaches that marginalize rather than empower forest people through the 
recentralization of forest governance (Phelps et al., 2010; Sikor et al., 2010).  
Another worry is that REDD may lead to what have been known as “land 
grabs” (Castro Diaz, 2008; Griffith, 2007; Peskett et al., 2008; Robledo et al., 2008). 
Land grabs and the re-zoning of forest land by external actors without the 
participation of local people have been directly observed (Griffith, 2007). Castro 
Diaz demonstrates how indigenous people have been left out of negotiations related 
to REDD projects (2008). The recent case of Papua New Guinea further illustrates 
the importance of clear and enforced land rights (Melick, 2010; Mongobay, 2010; 
Palmer, 2010). Weak land tenure and associated problems also potentially play a 
negative role in poverty alleviation, for if payments depend on owning land, it is 
likely that they will not go primarily to poor people, even if they go to poor areas 
(Kerr et al., 2004; Grieg-Gran, forthcoming).  
 
4.2 Development 
There is a general hope that REDD funds could contribute to providing the 
resources needed for economic growth and development (Olander & Murray, 2007). 
According to Patanayak et al., protecting forests in Brazil could equilibrate the 
distribution of income, health and education in favor of rural residents (2009).  For 
example, watershed PES schemes have demonstrated significant potential for 
impacting poverty (Bond & Mayers, 2009; Bond et al., 2009; Porras et al., 2008). But 
this enthusiasm is tempered by many interrogations based on earlier experiences. 
Several issues must be addressed regarding the injection of large sums of money into 
national economies. Implementing the program on a large scale implies opportunity 
costs and a reorientation of economic activities based on forest exploitation 
(Chomitz, 1999; Chomitz et al., 2007; Grieg-Gran, forthcoming). The dependence 
on one source of revenue, comparable to external aid, has been highlighted, as well 
as the danger of provoking “Dutch disease” (the distortion of an economy due to 
high dependence on one economic sector) (Peskett et al., 2008). The possible 
impacts on internal prices for food or energy could produce depressive macro-level 
employment effects (Bond et al., 2009) and be detrimental to the poorest 
communities. Ebeling & Yasue correlate Human Development Indicators (HDIs) 
with areas likely to benefit from REDD schemes and find that the program will most 
likely not target the regions with the direst human development needs (2008). 
Griffiths foresees an unequal imposition of costs for the protection of forests onto 
local communities and indigenous peoples, underlined and enforced by inequitable 
and abusive contracts; he notes that the socioeconomic situation has sometimes 
worsened under these programs (2007).  
One of the most spectacular gaps in the related literature is an almost 
complete absence of interconnection between REDD and the abundant 
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development literature. One reason may be the divide among technical domains. 
Since most of the REDD literature concerns forestry, finance and technical issues, its 
authors tend not to be development experts. It appears that for some authors, 
REDD would emerge in a virgin world where everything is to be reinvented, 
whereas many of the issues facing REDD implementation are in fact well-known 
development problems. Building on the lessons learned in development over the last 
50 years would probably avoid much disappointment and resource waste.  
 
4.3 Equity 
Closely linked to the issue of poverty alleviation are concerns related to 
equity and whether REDD will instigate capture and control by the elite, to the 
detriment of those with less power and resources, as has been the case with other 
conservation schemes (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Fritzen, 2007; Kellert et al., 2000; 
Thompson & Homewood, 2002). Sommerville et al. hypothesize that REDD will 
benefit the elite more than the non-elite and that the failure to consider fairness and 
distribution issues can undermine PES or other conservation projects (2009). Cotula 
& Mayers observe that as the value of the standing forest increases, powerful actors 
look to gain power over these carbon-based assets, often to the detriment of the less 
powerful, arguing that elite capture and misappropriation of the funds are potential 
byproducts of REDD funding (2009). Opportunity and transactions costs have also 
been linked to inequity and the perception of fairness of distribution (Adhikari, 2005; 
Kumar, 2002). Bond et al. question the possibility that local peoples can participate 
as equals in selling carbon, emphasizing the potential for divergence in equity of 
payment levels and other terms due to negotiating capacity (2009). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The literature suggests major gaps in the way REDD is studied. The first and 
most salient gap is the absence of sustained analysis on the social impact of 
implementing REDD over the long term. This gap stems from the fact that most of 
the empirical studies conducted so far focus on how to make REDD work to reduce 
deforestation and channel funds to developing countries rather than the problems 
that such mechanisms, even if fulfilling the two aforementioned objectives, would 
pose from a social perspective. Conversely, the literature that does emphasize the 
potentially adverse social impact of REDD tends to be rather normative, 
condemning REDD as a dangerous and manipulative tool rather than objectively 
assessing its positive and negative contributions and proposing means to adjust it. If 
REDD is to become a socially acceptable large-scale mechanism for fighting climate 
change, managing forests and transferring resources, lessons must be learned from 
both earlier experiences (forest governance mechanisms, carbon sinks, PES) and 
from experimental REDD projects implemented thus far.  
Whereas forest conservation mechanisms have often required important legal 
reforms, most notably with respect to land apportionment and distribution, there is 
little material on how such reforms affect the human rights of both indigenous 
peoples (with non-formal entitlements to their traditional land) and other sectors of 
the population (with property and social rights, including access to unemployment 
benefits in case of relocation or professional re-orientation from forest-based 
activities to other sectors). Earlier experiences would suggest that if REDD were to 
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fulfill the expectations of both developing (regarding funding) and developed 
countries (regarding cheaper emission reductions), such results would come at the 
price of considerable social costs. The extent to which such costs may be worth 
bearing in light of the potential benefits from the implementation of REDD is a 
matter requiring empirical assessment. 
The second gap concerns the link between the operation of REDD schemes 
and governance structures. The lion‟s share of the literature focuses on those 
mechanisms that would be effective in making REDD work from the perspective of 
emissions reduction and financing. Some authors also mention the difficulties arising 
from implementing a complex system in countries and/or regions with a substantial 
governance deficit, but such difficulties are seldom, if ever, studied empirically. The 
experience of other forest-related mechanisms is typically brought to bear to shed 
light on the link between REDD and governance. However, the particular features 
of those other forest-related mechanisms make such assessments difficult to 
transpose. Only through an empirical assessment of ongoing REDD projects will it 
be possible to understand the link between REDD and governance structures. 
Based on the unprecedented crisis of climate change and the apparent 
consensus of the UNFCCC parties on this mechanism, REDD could be the first 
successful attempt to govern the forests at a global scale and to do so in a socially 
acceptable way. But with the mechanism as it stands, and with insufficient research 
to improve it, REDD could also constitute a missed opportunity to address these 
issues. There is still time to address these shortcomings and design REDD 
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